The concept of globalisation has gradually permeated criminology, but more so as applied to transnational organised crime, international terrorism and policing than in addressing processes of criminal justice reform. So how useful is it in understanding contemporary transformations in systems of youth and juvenile justice? Until the 1970s juvenile justice, was dominated by an entrenched series of debates circulating around the often-nebulous opposition of welfare and punishment. Since then neoliberal assaults on the social logics of the welfare state and public provision, particularly in Britain, USA, Canada and Australasia, have brought profound shifts in economic, social and political relations associated with the 'free market'. In their wake have emerged a renewed penalisation of young people and an emphasis on enforcing individual, family and community responsibility. Simultaneously many jurisdictions worldwide have begun to experiment with restorative justice and the prospect of rehabilitation through mediation. Widely ratified international directives, epitomised by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, have also begun to stress the importance of incorporating a rights consciousness into juvenile justice reform. These diverse trajectories in retribution, responsibility, restoration and rights have created a particularly complex contemporary landscape of youth governance. The concept of globalisation draws attention to the impact that these competing transformations have had on processes of policy and legal convergence. Based on a wide range of bibliographic and web resources, this article assesses the extent to which it is now possible to talk of a global juvenile/youth justice or whether persistent national and local divergences, together with the contradictions of contemporary reform, preclude any aspiration for the delivery of a universal and consensual product.
Introduction
There has been a remarkable correspondence in the nature of juvenile/youth justice reform particularly across many western societies in the past 40 years. Since the 1970s there has been a notable shift from a welfare model based on meeting individual needs to a justice model more concerned with the offence than the offender. By the 1980s 'justice' had, however, come to take on numerous forms from JM28/11/03 due process and rights; to 'just deserts' and authoritarian crime control. In the 1990s many states began experimenting with forms of restorative justice as a means of reintroducing a greater emphasis on rehabilitation whilst still holding young people accountable for their actions. By the 21 st century juvenile/youth justice had developed into a particularly complex agglomeration of competing and contradictory policies, including retribution, responsibility, rights, restoration and rehabilitation, which simultaneously exhibit strong exclusionary and inclusionary tendencies (Muncie and Hughes, 2002) . Of course these shifts were never uniform but no western society has been able to ignore their impact. The key issues addressed in this paper are why did this general trend from welfare to justice to just deserts to restoration and responsibility occur? and with what effects? To do so it assesses the analytical usefulness of the concept of globalisation.
The notion of globalization suggests a growing international economic, political, legal and cultural interconnectedness based on advances in technological communications, the removal of trade barriers underpinned neo-liberal economics and politics and the formulation of directives in international law. It is contended that shifts in political economy, particularly those associated with capital mobility and information exchange, across advanced industrialised countries have progressively eroded the foundations of redistributive welfare states and severely constrained the range of strategic political strategies and policy options that individual states can pursue (Beck, 2000) . The concept of globalisation suggests two inter-related transformations of interest to criminology. Firstly that criminal justice policies are converging worldwide (or at least across the Anglophone global north). A combination of macro socioeconomic developments, initiatives in international human rights and accelerations in processes of policy transfer and diffusion can be viewed as symptomatic of a rapid homogenisation of criminal justice policies. The necessity of attracting international capital compels governments (if they are to achieve status as modern states) to adopt similar economic, social and criminal justice policies in part aided by geo-political mobility and subsequent policy transfer, diffusion and learning. Secondly this homogenisation, it is contended, is underpinned by a fundamental shift in state/market relations. A loss (or at least a major reconfiguration) of 'the social' is evidenced in the processes whereby neo-liberal conceptions of the market and international capital encourage the formulation of policies based less on principles of social inclusion and JM28/11/03 3 more on social inequality, deregulation, privatisation, penal expansionism and welfare residualism. In effect, the thesis presages the decline of social democratic reformist politics and projects worldwide (Mishra, 1999) . And it is children, as the least powerful members of communities, who are the most likely to routinely feel the brunt of this neo-liberal economic project.
This paper assesses the pertinence of such thematics to understanding global, international, national and local shifts in contemporary youth and juvenile justice policy and practice. But 'globalisation' immediately poses some thorny questions for the study of systems of youth justice. Is it synonymous with such competing terms as universalism and transnationalisation? Does it signify a wholesale removal of national and international borders or does it conjure up visions that are peculiarly western?
Policy making in this area has also traditionally been studied with regard to national sovereignty and the independence of the nation state. Indeed criminal justice remains a powerful icon of sovereign statehood. As a result the paper explores how youth justice is embroiled, not simply in the processes of globalization, but in negotiating its way through a number of diverse and multi-tiered national and local modes of governance. Global processes of convergence may not be as singular and one dimensional as might be first assumed.
Global processes 1: From welfare to neo-liberal governance
It has been widely observed that since the 1960s penal welfarism has been undermined by the development of forms of neo-liberal or 'advanced' governance (Bell, 1993; Rose, 1996a and b; Garland, 1996; . This fundamental change in criminal and juvenile justice has been broadly characterized as placing less emphasis on the social contexts of crime and measures of state protection and more on prescriptions of individual/family/community responsibility and accountability. The shift has been captured in the notion of 'governing at a distance'. Welfarism has been increasingly critiqued for encouraging state dependence, overloading the responsibilities of the state and undermining the ability of individuals to take responsibility for their own actions. 'Old' notions of social engineering, social Numerous authors have remarked upon the impact that these processes have had in a growing homogenisation of criminal justice across western societies, driven in particular by the spread of punitive penal policies from the USA (see for example, Wacquant, 1999; Garland, 2001) . In youth and juvenile justice these shifts are recognised in a general diminution of a welfare-based-mode of governance in favour of various 'justice' based responsibilisation and managerial strategies (Muncie and Hughes, 2002) . Six recurring and inter-related themes can be identified (Muncie, 2003a ):
Diminution of welfare: By the late 1970s, liberal lawyers, civil libertarians and radical social workers were becoming increasingly critical of 'welfare-based' procedures and sentencing. They argued that meeting the 'needs' of offenders acted as a spurious justification for placing excessive restrictions on individual liberty, particularly for young women, which were out of proportion either to the seriousness of the offence or to the realities of being in 'need of care and protection'. Social work interventions were considered to not only preserve explanations of individual pathology, but also to undermine the right to natural justice. Young people were considered in double jeopardy, sentenced for their background as well as for their offence. In the wake of these criticisms a new justice based model of corrections emerged. Its leading proponent, Von Hirsch (1976) proposed that proportionality of punishment to fit the crime, determinacy of sentencing, equity and protection of rights through due process and an end to judicial, professional and administrative discretion be reinstated at the centre of youth and criminal justice practice. The idea of punishing the crime, not the JM28/11/03 5 person, had clear attractions for those seeking an end to the abuses of discretional power. Indeed the impact of this 'back to justice' was reflected in juvenile/youth justice reform in many western jurisdictions at the time. A focus on 'deeds' rather than 'needs' formally expunged many of the last vestiges of welfarism from many youth justice systems.
Adulteration: This liberal critique of welfare, however, also coalesced with the concerns of traditional retributivists that rehabilitation was a 'soft option'. For them tougher sentencing would enable criminals to get their 'just deserts'. Within the political climate of the 1980s a discourse of 'justice and rights' was appropriated as one of 'individual responsibility and obligation'. Accordingly, Hudson (1987) has argued that the 'just deserts' or 'back to justice' movements that emerged in many western jurisdictions in the 1980s was evidence of a 'modern retributivism' rather than necessarily heralding the emergence of new liberal regimes and a positive rights
agenda. An 'adulteration' of youth justice has witnessed widespread dismantlingparticularly in the US -of special court procedures which had been in place for much of the 20 th century to protect young people from the stigma and formality of adult justice (Fionda, 1998; Grisso and Schwartz, 2000; Schaffner, 2002) . The emphasis has become one of fighting juvenile crime rather than securing juvenile justice. The principle of doli incapax was abolished in England and Wales in 1998. Similarly
Canada's 2003 youth justice reforms are based on the core principle that the protection of society be uppermost. As such, the age at which the youth court is empowered to impose adult sentences has been lowered from 16 to 14.
(www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/yjca).
Risk factor prevention:
In place of traditional attempts to isolate specific causes of crime has emerged a risk factor prevention paradigm which focuses attention on the potential for harm, disorder and misbehaviour (rather than crime itself). These risk factors include hyperactivity, large families, poor parental supervision, low achievement and family disharmony (Farrington, 1996) . It has been argued that these risks have a strong transatlantic replicability (Farrington, 2000) and certainly an obsession with identifying, assessing and managing 'risk' is central to youth justice practice not only in England and the US but also in Australia (Cunneen and White, 2002) and Canada (Smandych, 2001 Invariably those considered most at risk are precisely those marginalised and socially excluded (street children, the disadvantaged, the impoverished, migrant children, the destitute and so on) who critics of neo-liberalism would claim are the first 'victims' of a widening income gap between rich and poor.
Responsibilisation: Garland (1996, p.452) refers to a responsibilisation strategy involving 'central government seeking to act upon crime not in a direct fashion through state agencies (police, courts, prisons, social work, etc.) but instead by acting indirectly, seeking to activate action on the part of non-state agencies and organizations'. The message is that all of us -from property owners to manufacturers to school authorities, families and individuals -have a responsibility to reduce criminal opportunities and increase informal controls. Rose and Miller (1992) reasoned that this was not a simple case of state abrogation or of privatization of public issues, but of a new mode of 'governing at a distance'. The state may issue directives, but responsibility for their enactment is passed down to local bodies and communities. In this climate notions of communitarianism, 'joined up' partnerships, Communities that Care (CtC), community justice, community policing, community safety and multi agency collaboration have proliferated, particularly in the UK, Canada and the US (Hughes and Edwards, 2002) . The globalising appeal of zero tolerance policing strategies also ensures that youth crime and disorder is increasingly politicised and has come to dominate concerns about quality of life, urban renewal and social policy in general. Social problems are defined in terms of their criminogenic potential and criminal justice systems are taking over some of the roles that were previously undertaken by welfare and child protection agencies (Crawford, 2002) .
Actuarial justice: Juvenile/youth justice has become progressively more disengaged from philosophies of welfare and/or justice in favour of improving internal system coherence through evidence-led policy, standardised risk assessments, technologies of actuarial justice and the implementation of managerial performance targets.
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Rehabilitation or due process have been replaced by the rather less transformative rationales of processing complaints and applying punishments in an efficient and cost effective manner. Indicators that measure 'outputs' rather than 'outcomes' have begun to take on a life of their own such that the meeting of targets has become an end in itself (Feeley and Simon, 1992 , Garland, 1996 , Kempf-Leonard and Peterson, 2000 .
Penal expansionism: Prison populations have been growing in many countries since the 1980s. Of the 205 surveyed by Walmsley (2003) , 68% recorded increases since the mid 1990s. An increasingly internationalised alliance of private industrial and penal interests has emerged that has a vested interest in penal expansion (Christie, 2000) . This is most notable in prison building programmes and in the technological apparatus of crime control, such as CCTV and electronic monitoring. Juvenile codes have been reformulated to prioritise punishment. Certain groups -particularly immigrants -are identified as a threatening and permanently excluded underclass about which little can be done but to neutralise and segregate them in 'gulags of incapacitation': a process Wacquant (2001) has referred to as the neo-liberal 'penalisation of poverty'. Vengeance and cruelty are no longer an anathema to many parts of criminal justice (Simon, 2001) . Politics and culture have become saturated with images of moral breakdown, incivility and the decline of the family (Garland 2001) . A loose knit set of policy networks and think tanks have constructed a 'neoliberal penal policy complex' that encourages the dissemination of punitive and exclusionary practices (Newburn, 2002) .
Collectively these processes suggest an acceleration of the governance of young people through crime and disorder (Simon, 1997 
Global Processes 2: Policy transfer and convergence
Policy transfer can be considered as one of the most tangible effects of such processes. Numerous authors have remarked upon a growing similarity in criminal justice across western societies, driven in particular by neo-liberalism and the spread of penal policies particularly from the USA (Wacquant, 1999; Christie, 2000; Garland, 2001; Jones and Newburn, 2002; Newburn, 2002) . It has become more and However the possibility of an Anglo-American convergence tends to dominate the literature on policy transfer (Dolowitz , 2000; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Garland, 2001 ). And at first sight it seems apposite. In the early days of opposition Labour persistently challenged and condemned the Conservatives' overt transatlantic policy transfers in both social and criminal justice matters. The left of centre preferred to look to Europe. However after Blair's visit to the USA in 1993, which presaged the new doctrine of 'being tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime', New
Labour also shifted its focus from Europe to the New Democratic policies of the USA. Since the mid 1990s, not only compulsory and conditional welfare-to-work JM28/11/03 9 (workfare) but also zero tolerance policing, night curfews, electronic tagging, mandatory minimum sentences, drugs czars, the naming and shaming of young offenders, community courts, private prisons, Chicago style policing based on neighbourhood focus groups, strict controls over parents and, for a short period in the 1990s, boot camps have all, in some form, been transported to England. A tough stance on crime and welfare has become the taken-for-granted mantra to achieve electoral success. But as Sparks (2001, p. 165) has put it, there may be inherent difficulties to this type of comparative analysis because of the 'distracting sway of the American case as a pole of attraction'. It tends to drive out historical and cultural difference by assuming that what happens in the US will always presage comparable developments elsewhere.
Indeed it is also clear that youth justice in England and more widely across Europe has also been informed by contra penal trajectories such as those derived from the import of restorative justice conferencing pioneered in New Zealand and Australia.
The transfer of policy is clearly not one directional or one dimensional (Karstedt, 2001 between offender, victim and mediator to achieve reconciliation (Justice, 2000) . But there is little evidence of a pan-European homogeneity. European implementation of restorative principles is marked by heterogeneity rather than convergence. In Belgium, Finland and Norway restoration is an extension of existing welfare, education or rehabilitative strategies. In England, as evidenced, for example, in its referral orders and youth offender panels restoration is more authoritarian and paternalistic aimed at responsibilising the offender. In Norway victim-offender mediation is used as an alternative to judicial processing whereas in most jurisdictions it is integrated into other criminal justice processes. Some systems are victim oriented (Denmark), some focus on the offender (France, Spain) and in others the orientation is mixed. Belgium employs restorative principles at all stages of the judicial process; in
France and England and Wales it only operates at a pre-or initial trial stage, whilst in
Denmark it is employed at the moment of sentence (Miers, 2001 ).
In some contrast restorative justice processes in New Zealand and in most Australian states are now established in statute as the fundamental rationale for youth justice.
Their aim is to keep young people out of formal court processes by way of various types of family group conferences. Most academic and policy entrepreneur research speaks highly of such an approach in impacting on re-offending (particularly for less serious violent offenders) and on ensuring that both victim and offender are the key participants and decision-makers in determining any future action (Morris and Maxwell, 2001; Miers, 2001; Bazemore and Walgrave, 1999 (Blagg, 1997) . In general the danger remains that any form of compulsory restoration may degenerate into a ceremony of public shaming and degradation, particularly when it operates within systems of justice that are driven by punitive, exclusionary and coercive values and whose primary intent is the infliction of further harm (as currently seems to be case in England and Wales and the US)..
Neither is it probably any coincidence that restorative justice and neo-liberal ideologies have emerged simultaneously. Both proclaim an end to state monopoly and a revival of community responsibilisation. Whilst appearing progressive and rehabilitative, restoration can simply be used to once more enforce neo-liberal notions of individual responsibility (Gelsthorpe and Morris, 2002) . Nevertheless it does open a space to consider a series of replacement discourses of 'social harm', 'social conflict', and 'redress' to challenge conservative neo-liberal conceptions of punitive populism and retributive justice (De Haan, 1990; Walgrave, 1995) . It opens a door to the development of a restorative social justice based on community building, solidarity and empowerment (White, 2000; .
The notion of homogenised policy transfer has also been critiqued by those concerned not just with issues of structural convergence/divergence but with the role of 'agency'
in the formulation and implementation of specific policies (Jones and Newburn, 2002; Nellis 2000) . Detailed empirical examinations of policy making in different countries reveal important differences in substance and significant differences in the processes through which policy is reformed and implemented. Both O'Donnell and O'Sullivan (2003) and Jones and Newburn (2002) , for example, argue that the concept of zero tolerance associated with New York policing reforms in the early 1990s barely survived its import to Ireland and the UK. The strategies adopted by the NYPD were only employed by some minor experiments in mainstream British policing. Its impact has been more on the level of political rhetoric, fuelled by Fianna Fail in Ireland and by cross party commitments in the UK to develop more punitively sounding policies that can be widely perceived as being 'tough on crime'. Similarly Nellis' analysis of the transatlantic transfer of electronic monitoring from the USA to England in particular (but also to Singapore, some Australian states, Sweden and the Netherlands) makes clear that the terms ' inspiration' and 'emulation' rather than 'copying' best describe the processes involved.
These lines of enquiry suggest that policy transfer is rarely direct and complete but is partial and mediated through national and local cultures (which are themselves changing at the same time). Policy transfer can be viewed as simply a pragmatic response where nothing is ruled in and nothing ruled out. Authoritarian, restorative and actuarial justice might all be perceived as useful tactics to employ to get the crime rate down. Or they can be viewed as symptomatic of juvenile/youth systems that have lost their way and no longer adhere to any fundamental values and principles, whether they are rooted in welfare, punishment, protection or rights. The logic of assuming we
can learn 'what works' from others is certainly seductive. It implies rational planning and an uncontroversial reliance on a crime science which is free of any political interference. But it also assumes that policies can be transported and are transportable without cognisance of localised cultures, conditions and the politics of space. (Muncie, 2002) .
Policy transfer and international dialogue will probably become a more dominant aspect of juvenile/youth justice if only because of the possibilities opened up by the JM28/11/03 13 growth in international telecommunications. But at a nation state and at regional and local levels things may look a bit differently. Individual states continue to jealously guard their own sovereignty and control over law and order agendas. Local implementation of key reforms may also reveal a continuing adherence to some traditional values and a resistance to change.
Global processes 3: International Conventions
The 1989 when the Convention appears to be incompatible with Islamic law and domestic legislation (Schabas, 1996) . The UK has also reserved its option to deploy children in protection from arbitrary interference (Freeman, 2002) . More seriously, many of the principles of restorative justice which rely on informality, flexibility and discretion sit uneasily against legal requirements for due process and a fair and just trial.
In many countries it seems abundantly clear that it is possible to claim an adherence to the principle of universal rights whilst simultaneously pursuing policies which exacerbate structural inequalities and punitive institutional regimes. 'Cultural difference' and the absence of localised human rights cultures preclude meaningful adoption of international agreements (Harris-Short, 2003). The US case is indicative.
Violations of the Convention appear built in to aspects of US law which allow for the death penalty, prosecution in adult courts and which fail to specify a minimum age of criminal responsibility (Amnesty, 1998). Moreover relying on international statements of due process and procedural safeguards can do little to deliver justice on the ground.
The development of positive rights agendas remains limited (Scraton and Haydon, 2002) . Little attention has also been given to the extent to which legal globalisation JM28/11/03 itself is a concept driven by Western notions of 'civilised' human rights. Far from opening up challenges to neo-liberalism, rights agendas may simply act to bolster Western notions of individuality and freedom whilst implicitly perpetuating imperial and postcolonial notions of a barbaric and authoritarian 'global east' or 'global south'.
It is indicative in itself that of those countries where the UN Committee has identified 'tradition' and 'culture' as impeding implementation, the vast majority are 'nonWestern'.
Comparative juvenile justice 1: rates, flows and stocks of youth imprisonment
There are relatively few rigorous comparative analyses of youth and juvenile justice.
Most provide important case studies of particular jurisdictions but tend to be stronger on the descriptive than the analytical (see Bala etal 2002; Winterdyk, 2002; Doek, 2002) . In many respects this is not surprising. Doing comparative research is fraught with difficulties (Nelken, 1994; Aggregate figures such as these also tend to suppress the disproportionately high rates of incarceration for particular ethnic groups: a notable feature of juvenile justice not only in the US but also in the imprisonment of aboriginals in Canada and Australia.
Nevertheless they remain our best guide to the relative punitive climate of particular countries and their administrations. Across the world the US consistently emerges as a particularly atypical (and excessively punitive) case, as does England and Wales in Europe. In these countries there appears little reluctance to locking up young people and to designate such places of detention as 'prison' whilst doing so.
Comparative juvenile justice 2: national sovereignty and cultural diversity
The UK countries stand out as having some of the lowest ages of criminal responsibility in the European Union. These ages range from 8 in Scotland, and 10 in are currently considering whether to lower this to 14 or below (Asquith, 1996) . In contrast, England and Wales abolished the principle of doli incapax for 10 to 14 year olds in 1998 despite recurring complaints from the UN. In Holland, too, the conditions governing the possibility of transferring juvenile cases to an adult court have also been recently relaxed.
The 'adulteration' of youth justice is though most clearly marked in the USA which has witnessed widespread dismantling of special court procedures which had been in place for much of the 20 th century to protect young people from the stigma and formality of adult justice. (Streib, 2003) . In some states there is no age limit at all to adult criminal prosecution and trial.
The push for 'adult justice' is however far from uniform. Belgium and Scotland stand out as examples where the primacy of the welfare principle remains the fundamental rationale for youth justice. In Belgium all judicial interventions are legitimated through an educative and protective, rather than punitive and responsibilising discourse (Walgrave and Mehlbye, 1998) (Downes, 1988; Komen, 2002) . HALT projects begun in Rotterdam in 1981 and various other social crime prevention initiatives replaced judicial intervention with reparation schemes and advice agencies to improve youth's 'survival skills'. However there has been a dramatic reversal in Dutch penal policy from the mid 1980s onwards. Once heralded as a beacon of tolerance and humanity, Holland embarked on a substantial prison building programme linked to a tendency to expand pre-trial detention and to deliver longer sentences on conviction (Pakes, 2000) . In 2002 Dutch city councils gave the police new powers to arbitrarily stop and search without reasonable suspicion in designated areas of 'security risk'.
The practice has amounted to the criminalisation of poor and black neighbourhoods, targeting in particular Moroccan youth (Statewatch Jan-Feb, 2003, p.8) .
In Germany the average number of over 14 year olds in prison increased by 21 per cent during the 1990s (Suhling, 2003) . In Ireland prison building and expansion has been a notable feature of the 1990s despite falling crime rates (O'Donnell and O'Sullivan, 2003) . These shifts in part appear driven by neo-liberal market reform, welfare residualism, fears of migrants, changes in the labour market and a related lowering of the tolerance level for crime and violence. Fear and insecurity fuel a popular punitiveness that demands some overt 'norm enforcing system' that is both retributive and interventionist (Junger-Tas, 2002) .
In France in the 1980s the Mitterand government responded to a series of violent disturbances in Lyon and Marseilles, not by implementing more authoritarian measures, but by developing means of education and vocational opportunity and avenues for local political participation and incorporation. The Bonnemaison initiative involved the recruitment of older youth (animateurs) to act as paid youth workers with youngsters in the ghetto suburbs. These were connected with residents and local government officials to form crime prevention committees designed to address issues of citizenship and urban redevelopment as well as those of security. It is widely assumed that such strategies, based on local democratic representation, rather than repression, were at least initially successful in achieving a greater integration particularly for children of North African origin (King, 1988 (King, , 1991 King and Petit, 1985; Pitts, 1995 Pitts, , 1997 . Since the 1980s however there is compelling evidence of a greater convergence of French and English crime prevention strategies JM28/11/03 21 made up of a patchwork of zero tolerance policing and of situational and social methods (Crawford, 2001; Roche, 2002) . The right wing government of Alain Juppe from 1993 to 1997 prioritised a zero tolerance police led approach to crime prevention. It is a policy that was continued by the left wing Jospin government. The socio-economic conditions that produce youth marginalisation and estrangement are no longer given central political or academic attention (Bailleau, 1998) . Rather concern is directed to migrant children, particularly from Africa, Asia and Eastern
Europe who have arrived in search of political asylum and economic opportunity.
Special surveillance units have been established to repress delinquency in 'sensitive neighbourhoods', penalties for recidivism have been increased and the deportation of foreigners speeded up (Wacquant, 2001) .Since the return to power of the right in 2002 a new public safety law has expanded police powers of search, seizure and arrest, instituted prison sentences for public order offences (such as being disrespectful to those in authority), lowered from 16 to 13 the age at which young offenders can be imprisoned and introduced benefit sanctions for parents of offending children (Henley, 2002) .
In Scotland the Scottish Executive (2003) has recently decided to pilot the reestablishment of youth courts for 16 and 17 year olds. Ostensibly this is to deal with 'persistent offenders' but would also overcome the Scottish anomaly of being the only Western European country to routinely deal with this age group in the adult courts.
Whilst these broad political shifts have yet to produce any notable expansion in prison populations in all jurisdictions, it is clearly associated with a break up of social democratic welfare humanitarianism and the emergence of a new moralism of 'zero tolerance' associated with the disciplinary techniques of the free market (Tham, 2001 ). Such analyses clearly resonate with the 'criminalisation of the undesirable and the unfortunate' and the expansion of interventionist and authoritarian policies characteristic of the US and England and Wales. Across Europe where a philosophy of child protection and support continues to hold greater sway it is increasingly being tested by new discourses of responsibility. The irony for all though is that during the last decade youth crime rates across Europe, Canada and the US have been mostly falling or at least stable. Finland is one of a very few countries to be able to claim that community penalties are given as direct alternatives (rather than as additions) to prison sentences. Immediate 'unconditional' sentencing to custody is a rarity (National Research Institute, 1998) .
The Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie (cited in Karstedt, 2001 ) has argued that this dramatic shift has been made possible by a conscious effort on the part of successive Finnish governments to formulate a national identity closer to that of other Scandinavian states. In turn it has been argued that this reductionist movement has rested on the formulation that 'social development policy is the best criminal policy' (Kuure, 2002) .
In Italy, judges have an additional power to grant a 'judicial pardon' which together with a policy of 'liberta controllata' (a form of police supervision) and a greater willingness to defer control to families means that young people are incarcerated only for a very few serious violent offences (Ruxton, 1996; Dunkel, 1991; Nelken, 2002) .
The exception seems to be for non-nationals, particularly young Romanis. Cultural difference is also a key factor. An Italian cultural tradition of soft paternal authoritarianism has been traditionally linked to low levels of penal repression. The 'cultural embeddedness' of Catholic paternalism (compared for example to US evangelical Protestantism) may not determine penal policy but provides the parameters in which the purpose and meaning of punishment is understood (Melossi, 2000) . Similarly Japan's relative non-punitiveness has been accounted for in the context of a tradition of 'maternal protectionism' and a culture of 'amae sensitivity' which prioritises interdependence over individual accountability (Morita, 2002) .
In Trondheim, Norway in 1994 a five year old girl was murdered by two six-year-old boys. The exceptionality of this case mirrored that of the murder of James Bulger by two 10-year-old boys a year earlier in England. In the seven subsequent years public, media and political outcry remained unabated in the UK, continually dwelling on the 'leniency' of their sentence, their 'privileged' access to specialised rehabilitation and their eventual 'premature' release under a cloak of fearful anonymity. In Norway the murder was always dealt with as a tragedy in which the local community shared a collective shame and responsibility. The boys were never named. They returned to school within two weeks of the event (Muncie, 2002) . Some commentaries on an England/France comparison also continue to maintain that a culture of French republicanism, driven by notions of legal equality and of social solidarity and integration, ensures more of a lasting rejection of American punitiveness than seems to be possible or politically acceptable in countries such as England and Wales (Pitts, 2001 ).
However it is explained it is clear that locking up young people is driven by something other than global increases in crime, or, as has been most recently assumed, by increases in violent crime. International research has consistently found that there is no correlation between crime rates and custody rates (Council of Europe, 2000) . The use of custody appears politically and culturally, rather than pragmatically, inspired. For some jurisdictions prison seems to 'work' at a political and symbolic level even when it is a demonstrable failure.
Local contingencies and resistances
The 'catastrophic' images raised by some neo-liberal readings of governance may help us to identify significant macro social changes, but are less attuned to resistance to change, to contradictions within neo-liberalism and its often hybrid nature, to the inherent instability of neo-liberal strategies and to the simultaneous emergence of other competing transformational tendencies (Muncie and Hughes, 2002) . Neoliberalism not only has a global impact but also, under the rubric of 'governing at a distance' has encouraged the proliferation of 'local solutions' to local problems. To fully understand the workings and influences on juvenile/youth justice we need to be attuned to the twin and contradictory processes of delocalisation and relocalisation (Crawford, 2002) . The risks and hazards of globalisation have simultaneously produced a 'retreat to the local' and nostalgia for tradition and community. The local governance of crime and insecurity is evidenced in the prolific discourses of 'community safety' in the UK and of 'urban security' across Europe (Hughes, 2002) .
Both are informed by notions of community participation, proactive prevention, informalism, partnership and multi-agency collaboration. Given that they are directed not only at crime but also incivilities and the antisocial, it is not surprising that their usual target is the (mis)behaviour of young people, particularly in 'high risk'
neighbourhoods. Yet what emerges from studies of the actual conduct of governance in particular localities is not uniformity, but diversity. In Australia and the US there are wide divergences in custody rates from state to state. In such countries as Spain,
Italy, Germany and France it is indeed difficult to prioritise national developments above widely divergent regional differences, most evident in sentencing disparities.
Again, the possibility of identifying coherent and consistent patterns in (youth and juvenile) governance is called into question (Hughes and Edwards, 2002) .
Broad governmental mentalities -whether global or national -will always be subject to revision when they are activated on the ground. Policy transfer will be piecemeal and reconfigured in local contexts. Whatever the rhetoric of government intention, the history of youth justice (e.g. in England and Wales) is also a history of active and passive resistance from pressure groups and from the magistracy, the police and from youth justice workers through which such reform is to be effected. At one level this is reflected in the wide disparities between courts in the custodial sentencing of young people. In England and Wales, for example, these range from 1 custodial sentence for every 10 community sentences in the South-West to 1 in 5 in the West Midlands and the North-West. On another level it is reflected in the haphazard implementation of national legislation and youth justice standards in different localities (Holdaway et al, 2001 ). Indeed Cross et al (2003) have begun to detect divergences between policy and practice in Wales and in England. Significantly the Welsh Assembly decided to locate youth justice services in the portfolio of Health and Social Services rather than Crime Prevention thus prioritising a 'children first' rather than an 'offender first' (as in England) philosophy. There is also always a space to be exploited between written and implemented policy. The translation of policy into practice depends on how it is visioned and reworked (or made to work) by those empowered to put it into practice.
As a result youth justice practice is likely to continue to be dominated by a complex of both rehabilitative 'needs' and responsibilized 'deeds' programmes. Joined up strategic co-operation will often coexist with sceptical and acrimonious relations at a practitioner level (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994) . A social work ethic of 'supporting young people' may well subvert any partnership or national attempt to simply responsibilise the young offender. This is also because many of the 'new' global, neoliberal targets for intervention -inadequate parenting, low self esteem, poor social skills, poor cognitive skills -are remarkably similar to those targets identified by a welfare mode of governance. The incongruity between such latent welfarism and the retributive nature of penal expansionism may well create some space in which the complex welfare needs of children in trouble can be re-expressed (Goldson, 2000) .
Equally there is a growing recognition that securing universal children's rights depends as much (if not more) on grassroots initiatives than on 'agreements' between nation states as epitomised by the UN Convention (Veerman and Levine, 2000) . The ill-defined rhetoric of crime prevention can also enable localised social programmes to be re-elevated as those most likely to secure 'community safety'. Thus even in the US -reputedly the bastion of conservative neo-liberalism -we can still find numerous programmes funded by justice departments and run by welfare/police partnerships which appear more concerned with social support (e.g. providing housing, health care, employment opportunities) rather than overt crime control (Mears, 2002) . Moreover such reinventions of the social can also be based on long term and large scale programmes which address such issues as poverty, powerlessness, discrimination, and so on, which fly in the face of neo-liberal, shortterm, 'what works' evaluative, or neo-conservative punitive, agendas. Long range projects of 'the social' can survive or be reborn (O'Malley, 2001 ).
Rather than an inexorable global conquest of American inspired neo liberal rationalities and technologies, this analysis of juvenile/youth justice gives weight to a succession of local encounters of complicity and resistance. It ensures that the role of 'agency' is centred in understanding processes of policy implementation.
Youth/juvenile justice, as one element of penal policy, remains stubbornly local and contingent (Tonry, 2001) .
Conclusion
Understanding the role of globalisation in processes of international and national criminal justice reform is in its infancy. This exploration of juvenile/youth justice has revealed some of the possibilities and pitfalls that await any research in this area. As an analytical concept globalisation is both seductive and flawed. It is seductive because it seems to offer some valuable means through which sense can be made of a widely recognised dismantling of welfare statism and a resurgence in authoritarian responses to juvenile offending; it is flawed because it encourages the tendency to deliver reductionist and economistic readings of policy convergence. (2000) has argued, its effect is neither uniform nor consistent. The empirical 'evidence' of juvenile/youth justice reform considered in this paper does more to deny than confirm any flattening of national political and cultural difference. The diversity of reform trajectories warns against any attempt to imply homogeneity. What is required is a level of analysis which neither elevates nor negates globalisation but recognizes that the global is only realized in specific localities and through which it will inevitably be reworked, challenged and contested. The key issue to be addressed is not how globalisation is producing uniformity but how it is activating diversity.
Juvenile and youth justice may be becoming more globalised through the impact of neo-liberalism, policy transfer and international conventions, but at the same time it is becoming more localised through national, regional and local enclaves of difference, coalition and resistance. Individual nation states are undoubtedly being challenged by global processes, but analysis at the level of the nation state also appears limited and All such processes are mediated by distinctive national and sub-national cultures and socio-cultural norms when they are activated on the ground.
In every country and in every locality youth justice appears to be 'made up' through unstable and constantly shifting alliances between neo-liberal, conservative and social democratic mentalities. In terms of policy, the authoritarian, the retributive, the restorative and the protective continually jostle with each other to construct a multimodal landscape of youth governance (Muncie, 2003a) . The end result is ongoing processes of multiplicity (as well as uniformity), divergence (as well as convergence)
and contingency (as well as determinism). This hybridity activates multiple lines of invention, contestation and contradiction in policy making and implementation. As a result it is impossible to identify, and fruitless to try and construct, any pure models of juvenile/youth justice.
Globalisation does not simply produce uniform or homogenising outcomes. It also produces social differentiation, segmentation and contestation. Economic globalisation suggests the unfettered freedom of the market; legal globalisation suggests universal regulation through the instruments of human rights. Similarly whilst some nation states may well be in a process of being reconstituted by global (neo-liberal economics), international (e.g. UN conventions; European integration) and national (e.g. privatisation) pressures, criminal justice tends to be held onto as a powerful symbolic display of local sovereignty. The epitome of this, of course, is the US and its belligerent opposition to the authority of any international courts and human rights conventions. Questions of who is criminalised and how are they to be dealt with are nationally and locally specific political and cultural decisions. The forces of globalisation, such as neo-liberal economics and international human rights conventions, cannot be ignored, but neither should the processes through which these forces have come to be negotiated in different localities and communities.
Essentialist conceptions of globalisation imply homogeneity and hegemonic dominance, but globalisation is but one element in a series of complex processes and political strategies that make up the multi-modal landscape of juvenile/youth justice which is being continually pushed and pulled in different directions at the same time.
The problem with the concept of globalisation is that it inevitably draws our attention to macro political and economic determinants. Dangers of over-generalisation and neglect of local variance abound. Rather what is required is an analysis of how global pressures work themselves out differentially in individual jurisdictions. Because the concept has been applied predominantly to transformations in western and Anglophone countries, our understanding of global processes to date might itself also be considered to be peculiarly ethnocentric.
To test this proposition, what is clearly required is more of an immersion in the culturally specific national, regional and local politics of reform than has been possible here.
